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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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SHEET METAL WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL UNION No. 19 
 
ASSOCIATED BUILDINGS AND CONTRACTORS, INC., 
Southeast Pennsylvania, Keystone, Delaware and New 
Jersey Chapters, 
       Amicus Curiae 
 
SHEET METAL WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL UNION No. 19, 
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ASSOCIATED BUILDINGS AND CONTRACTORS, INC., 
Southeast Pennsylvania, Keystone, Delaware and New 
Jersey Chapters, 
       Amicus Curiae 
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Argued May 18, 1998 
 
Before: ROTH and MCKEE, Circuit Judges, and 
O'NEILL, Senior District Judge* 
 
(Filed: August 31, 1998) 
 
       Bruce E. Endy (argued) 
       Spear, Wilderman, Borish, Endy, 
        Spear and Runckel 
       230 South Broad Street, Suite 1400 
       Philadelphia, PA 19102 
        Attorney for Local Union 19 
 
       Aileen A. Armstrong 
       Deputy Associate General Counsel 
       Jeffrey L. Horowitz (argued) 
       Frederic C. Harvard 
       National Labor Relations Board 
       1099 14th Street, N.W. 
       Washington, D.C. 20570 
        Attorneys for National Labor 
        Relations Board 
 
       Lawrence C. Coburn 
       Pepper Hamilton LLP 
       3000 Two Logan Square 
       18th & Arch Streets 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
        Attorney for amicus curiae 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
O'NEILL, Senior District Judge: 
 
This case requires us to decide whether a labor union 
may be liable for unfair labor practices under the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act), 29 U.S.C.A.S 151- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*The Honorable Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr., Senior District Judge of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
sitting by designation. 
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160 (West 1973), due to the actions of fellow unions 
pursuant to a joint venture theory of agency. We answer 
that question in the negative and remand to the Board for 




This case is before us on application of the Board for 
enforcement of its order against Sheet Metal Workers 
International Association, Local Union No. 19 (Union or 
Local No. 19) and the Union's cross petition for review of 
the Board's order. Unfair labor practice charges were filed 
against the Union by Delcard Associates, Inc., Omni 
Mechanical, Inc. and Joseph Stong, Inc. After investigating 
these charges, the Board's General Counsel issued 
complaints alleging that the Union violated SS 8(b)(1)(A) and 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. SS 158(b)(1)(A) and 
158(b)(4)(ii)(B), by restraining, coercing and threatening 
employees seeking access to their jobsites and by picketing 
at jobsite gates reserved for use by neutral employers.2 The 
complaints were consolidated for trial before an 
Administrative Law Judge. 
 
Following six days of hearings, the A.L.J. issued an 
opinion in which he found that the Union committed unfair 
labor practices at all three of the job sites. In addition, the 
A.L.J. found that the Union engaged in a joint venture with 
four other unions picketing at the Stong job site and was 
jointly responsible for unfair labor practices committed by 
those unions. The A.L.J. recommended a broad order 
requiring the Union to cease and desist from restraining 
and coercing employees of the three employers and any 
other employer. 
 
The Union filed exceptions to the A.L.J.'s findings of fact 
and legal conclusions and to the recommended order. With 
some minor exceptions not relevant here, the Board 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We have appellate jurisdiction over the Board's petition seeking 
enforcement and the Union's petition for review pursuant to SS 10(e) and 
10(f) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.A. S 160(e) and (f), respectively. 
 
2. The Board's General Counsel issued three different complaints 
reflecting the three different job sites, Delcard, Omni and Stong. 
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adopted the A.L.J.'s conclusions including the 
determination that the Union "was engaged in a joint 
venture with several other unions and thus was liable for 
the unlawful acts committed by the other unions," as well 
as the recommended broad cease and desist order. Sheet 
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 19, 316 N.L.R.B. 426, 
4-CB-3783, 4-CB-6879, 4-CB-6944, and 4-CC-2005-1, 




The factual background of this matter is fully described 
in the A.L.J.'s opinion and requires recital here only insofar 
as is relevant to resolution of the joint venture liability 
question.3 We will limit our discussion to the Stong job site 
because that was the only job site at which the A.L.J. and 
the Board found the Union vicariously liable for the unfair 
labor practices of other unions. 
 
Stong is a nonunion contractor. About November 1992, 
several local labor organizations affiliated with the Building 
& Construction Trades Council of Philadelphia & Vicinity 
(BCTC), commenced an organizational campaign among 
Stong's employees. On March 12, 1993, BCTC and several 
local unions (Road Sprinkler Fitters Local No. 669, 
Steamfitters Local No. 420, Plumbers Local No. 74, 
Sprinkler Fitters Local No. 692, Plumbers Local No. 690, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In addition to challenging the joint venture theory of liability, the 
Union raises several additional issues. One of these issues is the 
sufficiency of the evidence in support of the Board's conclusion that the 
Union itself committed unfair labor practices at all three job sites 
independent of the other unions. We find no merit to the Union's 
argument and affirm the Board's conclusion that the Union itself 
committed unfair labor practices at the Delcard, Omni and Stong job 
sites. 
 
The Union also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of 
the finding that the Union acted in conjunction with the other unions at 
the Stong job site, the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the 
finding that the other unions committed unfair labor practices at the 
Stong site, and the propriety of the broad cease and desist order. We 
need not reach these other issues because of our holding that the joint 
venture theory of agency is invalid. 
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and Local No. 19), petitioned for a Board-conducted election 
in a single unit comprising all Stong employees performing 
construction and/or fabrication work in Philadelphia and 
its vicinity. An election was conducted on May 13, which 
the unions lost. 
 
After the election, Swarthmore College commenced a 
construction project on which Stong was the only nonunion 
subcontractor. Stong's subcontract covered sprinkler work, 
installation of plumbing and piping, steam-fitter work, and 
related insulation. Swarthmore established three separate 
entrances to the campus for access to the project, with gate 
1 reserved for exclusive use by Stong. 
 
On June 2, the Union, together with Sprinkler Fitters 
Local No. 692, Plumbers Local No. 690, Steamfitters Local 
No. 420, and Asbestos Workers Local No. 14, commenced 
picketing at the Swarthmore site in furtherance of their 
labor dispute with Stong.4 The complaint alleges, and the 
A.L.J. found, that the Union violated S 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act5 
by blocking ingress of employees to the job site and 
impliedly threatening employees with violence in the course 
of picketing at gate 1 and S 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) 6 by picketing 
neutral employees at the other gates. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Local Nos. 669 and 74, who were part of the joint election campaign, 
played no role in the subsequent picketing at Swarthmore. 
 
5. Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A.S 158(b)(1)(A), provides: 
 
       (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a lab or organization 
or its 
       agents -- 
 
        (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the  exercise of the 
rights 
       guaranteed in section 157 of this title[.] 
 
Section 7, 29 U.S.C.A. S 157, provides: 
 
        Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, 
join, 
       or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
       representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other 
       concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other 
       mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain 
       from any or all of such activities[.] 
 
The A.L.J. and the Board found that the unions violated the Stong 
employees' right to refrain from exercising these rights by blocking their 
access to the job site and by implicitly threatening them with violence. 
6. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A.S 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), 
provides: 
 
       (b) Unfair labor practices by labor organization 
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It is undisputed that Local Nos. 692, 690, 420, 14, and 
the Union picketed at gate 1 during the period from June 
2 through July 22. All of the picketing unions except Local 
No. 14 were petitioners in the May election and all were 
affiliated with BCTC, a BCTC subsidiary group (Delaware 
and Chester County Building Trades) and the Mechanical 
Trades Council. At the BCTC meetings prior to the 
commencement of the Swarthmore project, representatives 
of the unions discussed Stong's participation in the 
Swarthmore project and eventually agreed that all would 
picket the site. They mutually arranged days for each union 
to picket and agreed upon the manner of picketing, 
including the number of pickets and the posting of 
"observers" at the neutral gates. They monitored and 
consulted with each other and exchanged information on 
the progress of the picketing. Representatives of the unions 
were present at each others' picket lines. During the 
picketing, the representatives of the unions met three times 
with either the general contractor or the College. The last of 
these meetings resulted in a joint agreement by the unions 
to cease picketing based on assurances they received from 
the College. After the picketing ceased, the picketing unions 
jointly distributed handbills at various locations over the 
names of the five picketing unions. 
 
Based on these facts the A.L.J. found that the unions 
were acting pursuant to a joint venture, and that therefore 
the Union was liable for the unfair labor practices 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or 
its 
       agents -- 
 
        (4)(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any p erson engaged in 
       commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either 
       case the object is -- 
 
        (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease u sing, selling, 
       handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any 
       other producer, processor or manufacturer[.] 
 
The A.L.J. and the Board concluded that the unions"induced and 
encouraged employees of [the general contractor] and Swarthmore to 
cease doing business with Stong[,] thereby violat[ing] Section 
8(b)(4)(b)." 
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 1995 WL 77107, at *25. 
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committed by the other unions. The A.L.J. made nofinding 
that Local No. 19 had control over the other unions; rather, 
he based his finding on a factual conclusion that the 





Our authority to review an order of the NLRB is limited. 
The Board's construction of a statute is ordinarily afforded 
considerable deference: "we will enforce a Board order that 
rests on a construction of the NLRA that is not`an 
unreasonable or unprincipled construction of the statute' " 
NLRB v. Joy Techs., Inc., 990 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1993), 
quoting Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1978); 
Dorsey Trailers, Inc. v. NLRB, 134 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 
1998); NLRB v. Greensburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 40 
F.3d 669, 670 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Bro-Tech Corp. v. 
NLRB, 105 F.3d 890, 894 (3d Cir. 1997) ("If the Board 
adopts a rule that is rational and consistent with the Act, 
then the rule is entitled to deference from the courts. . . . 
Deference to the Board, however, is not automatic but 
depends substantially on the persuasiveness of the agency 
view." ) (citations omitted). 
 
In Ford Motor Co., the Supreme Court held that the 
Board's construction of a statute was entitled to 
"considerable deference" because the issue in that case -- 
determining whether in-plant cafeteria and vending 
machine prices were "terms and conditions of employment" 
subject to mandatory collective bargaining under SS 8(a)(5) 
and 8(d) of the Act -- required use of the NLRB's expertise 
in the labor field. 441 U.S. at 495. Moreover, "Congress 
[had] assigned to the Board the primary task of construing 
these provisions in the course of adjudicating charges of 
unfair refusals to bargain." Id. 
 
This case requires us to interpret S 2(13) of the Act; 
Congress did not delegate to the Board the power to 
interpret that section. Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, No. 97- 
1387, 1998 WL 155574 (D.C. Cir. April 7, 1998). In 
addition, as discussed below, this case requires application 
of common law principles of agency and, unlike the issue in 
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Ford Motor Co., the NLRB has no special expertise applying 
those common law principles; that expertise lies with the 
Court. Therefore, "we accord only limited deference to the 
Board's agency law analysis." International Longshoremen's 
Ass'n (ILA) v. NLRB, 56 F.3d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 1158 (1996); Overnite Transp. Co., 1998 




The Union argues that S 8(b) of the Act applies only to the 
unfair trade practices of "a labor organization or its agent," 
that the other unions were not Local No. 19's agents, and 
that therefore it is not responsible for the acts of the other 
unions. We agree. 
 
The Board's decision approving the A.L.J.'s application of 
a joint venture theory of agency preceded the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia's rejection of a joint 
venture theory of agency in International Longshoremen's 
Ass'n (ILA) v. NLRB, 56 F.3d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1995). We follow 
the well-reasoned approach taken in ILA. 
 
In ILA the Union requested assistance from Japanese 
labor unions in its dispute with two shippers who were 
using nonunion labor to load fruit onto ships bound for 
Japan. The Japanese unions told the shippers that the 
unions would refuse to unload fruit in Japan that was not 
loaded by union labor. The shippers claimed that this was 
a secondary boycott that amounted to a unfair trade 
practice. The Longshoremen union did not violate the NLRA 
and the Japanese unions were beyond the scope of the Act. 
Therefore the shippers and the Board argued that the ILA 
was responsible for the Japanese unions' actions under a 
joint venture theory of agency. The NLRB sought and 
received an injunction in the Middle District of Florida 
under this joint venture theory which was affirmed on 
appeal by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. See 
Dowd v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 781 F. Supp. 
1565 (M.D. Fla. 1991), aff 'd, 975 F.2d 779 (11th Cir. 
1992). In its decision, the Court of Appeals held that the 
Board had demonstrated reasonable cause to believe that 
the ILA had violated the NLRA by articulating "a substantial 
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and not frivolous legal theory on which to attribute the 
actions of the Japanese unions to the ILA." 975 F.2d at 
784. Although acknowledging that the ILA had no right of 
control over the Japanese unions as is normally required to 
create an agency relationship, the Court concluded that: 
 
       [u]nder the liberal application of agency concepts 
       appropriate in the labor context, a contractual right to 
       control and direct the performance of another is not 
       required to impose responsibility under section 8(b) 
       where an employer or union has encouraged or 
       requested another to engage in unfair labor practices 
       on its behalf. 
 
Id. at 785 (footnote omitted). 
 
With the injunction in place, the parties submitted the 
case directly to the Board on stipulated facts. The Board 
reaffirmed the position it had argued to the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and an appeal to the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia followed. 
 
That Court first determined that "this case gives rise to 
an unfair labor practice under the NLRA section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) only if the threats issued by the Japanese 
unions somehow may be attributed to the ILA." ILA, 56 
F.3d at 211. The Court then turned to S 2(13) of the NLRA 
which provides: "In determining whether any person is 
acting as an `agent' of another person so as to make such 
other person responsible for his acts, the question of 
whether the specific acts performed were actually 
authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be 
controlling." Congress added this provision in 1947 to make 
clear that the Act was designed to render both employers 
and labor organizations responsible for the acts of their 
agents in accordance with ordinary common law rules of 
agency.7 Overnite Transp. Co., 1998 WL 155574, at *4; ILA, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. This Congressional intent was gleaned from the unusually clear 
legislative history and not from the plain language of the statute. We 
found nothing in the plain language of statute which validates or 
invalidates the Board's joint venture theory of agency. In fact, the plain 
language of S 2(13) is particularly uninstructive in analyzing this 
question because the section merely states which principles will not 
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56 F.3d at 211; see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510 at 36 
(1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1135, 1142;8 Local 
1814, International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 735 
F.2d 1384, 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Beyond doubt, the 
legislative intent of [section 2(13)] was to make the ordinary 
law of agency applicable to the attribution of individual acts 
to both employers and unions.") 
 
Applying the common law rules of agency, the Court 
reversed the Board's holding that Japanese unions were 
agents of the ILA because the ILA did not control the 
conduct of the Japanese unions. See ILA, 56 F.3d at 213 
("It is a fundamental principle of hornbook agency law that 
an agency relationship arises only where the principal `has 
the right to control the conduct of the agent with respect to 
matters entrusted to him.' Restatement (Second) of Agency 
S 14[.]"); see also AT & T Co. v. Winback and Conserve 
Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1434 (3d Cir.) ("An agency 
relationship is created when one party consents to have 
another act on its behalf, with the principal controlling and 
directing the acts of the agent." (citations omitted), cert. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
control and does not attempt to affirmatively pronounce which principles 
will apply. We note, however, that the language of S 2(13) is consistent 
with applying common law principles of agency because under those 
principles whether or not the acts performed were actually authorized or 
ratified by the principal is not controlling. See, e.g., Restatement 
(Second) of Agency S 159 (1958) (principals can be liable for 
unauthorized acts by an agent with apparent authority). 
 
8. This view was reinforced by Senator Taft's statement included in the 
legislative history: 
 
       This [amendment] restores the law of agency as it has been 
       developed at common law. . . . It is true that this definition was 
       written to avoid the construction which the Supreme Court in the 
       recent case of [United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 
       330 U.S. 395 (1947)] placed upon section 6 of the Norris-La Guardia 
       Act which exempts organizations from liability for illegal acts 
       committed in labor disputes unless proof of actual instigation, 
       participation, or ratification can be shown. . . . The conferees 
agreed 
       that the ordinary law of agency should apply to employers and 
       union representatives. 
 
93 Cong. Rec. 6859 (1947). 
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denied, 115 S.Ct. 1838 (1994)); Menichini v. Grant, 995 
F.2d 1224, 1233 n.14 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Agency law 
recognizes the principal's ability to control and monitor 
agent behavior[.]"); Restatement (Second) of Agency S 1(1) 
(1958) ("Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from 
the manifestation of consent by one person to another that 
the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, 
and consent by the other to act.")9  
 
The only reported case which gives credence to a joint 
venture theory of agency is the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit's affirmance of the injunction entered by 
the Middle District of Florida. Dowd, 975 F.2d 770. We 
agree with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
that the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's analysis 
is distinguishable. First, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit was called upon to review only whether 
there was reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the 
Act had occurred and limited its inquiry to an evaluation of 
whether the Board's theories of law and facts were not 
insubstantial and frivolous. Id. at 783. "This deferential 
review is appropriate at the injunction stage even where the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Joint ventures are generally governed by partnership law and, like a 
partner, a member of the venture may be regarded as both a principal 
and an agent of the other co-venturers. United States v. USX Corp., 68 
F.3d 811, 826 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Each member of a joint venture is 
`considered the agent of the others, so that the act of any member within 
the scope of the enterprise is charged vicariously against the rest.' "), 
quoting Pritchett v. Kimberly Cove, Inc., 568 F.2d 570, 579-580 (8th Cir. 
1977); 46 Am. Jur. 2d Joint Ventures S 24 (1994); 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency 
S 4 (1986). Members of the joint venture, however, are not considered 
agents of the other co-venturers pursuant to common law principles of 
agency, but pursuant to partnership law. Harold Gill Reuschlein & 
William A. Gregory, The Law of Agency and Partnership, 450-55 (2d ed. 
1990) (discussing the merging of partnership and joint venture law and 
stating that as a general rule joint ventures are governed by the same 
rules as partnerships); Adam B. Weissburg, Reviewing the Law on Joint 
Ventures with an Eye Toward the Future, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 487, 488 
(1990) (stating that courts apply partnership principles to joint 
ventures); 
46 Am. Jur. Joint Ventures S 3 (1994). Therefore, even if the other unions 
were agents of Local No. 19 under joint venture and partnership 
jurisprudence, they were not agents pursuant to common law principles 
of agency law and thus were not agents pursuant to S 8 of the Act. 
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theory underlying the petition is `untested' or`novel' in 
order to preserve the legal issue for Board determination." 
Id. Second, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
did not analyze S 2(13)'s legislative history, which the ILA 
Court found required invalidation of the Board's joint 
venture theory of agency. ILA, 56 F.3d at 213. 
 
We hold that the joint venture theory of agency adopted 
by the A.L.J. and the Board below is inconsistent with S 8 
of the Act. We therefore deny the Board's enforcement 
petition and grant in part and deny in part the Union's 
cross petition for review.10 Because the A.L.J. recommended 
and the Board entered the broad cease and desist order 
based at least partially on the conduct of the other unions 
who were not "agents" of the Union pursuant toS 8 of the 
Act, we remand to the Board for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The petition for review is granted to the extent it sought review of 
the 
A.L.J.'s and the Board's conclusion that the Union was liable for the 
unfair labor practices of other unions pursuant to a joint venture theory 
of agency. The Union's petition is denied to the extent it argued that 
there was insufficient evidence in support of the Board's conclusion that 
the Union committed unfair labor practices itself independent of the 
actions of the other unions. See supra n.3. 
 
                                12 
 
